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Internal audit function characteristics and external auditors’ co-sourcing in 
different institutional contexts 
 
      Abstract – We examine the association between several characteristics of an internal 
audit function (IAF) and fees paid to external auditors to support internal audit 
activities (co-sourcing). We also analyze how this relation is influenced by the 
mandatory or voluntary implementation of IAFs. By using data from the Common 
Body of Knowledge (CBOK) study, which was conducted by the Institute of Internal 
Auditors Research Foundation (IIARF) in 2015, we find that more consulting-
oriented IAFs and more autonomous IAFs are likely to pay higher co-sourcing fees, 
while IAFs with greater expertise are likely to pay lower co-sourcing fees. While 
results related to consulting activities hold regardless of the institutional context, the 
negative association between IAF expertise and co-sourcing fees paid to support 
internal audit activities only holds in mandatory IAF environments, and the positive 
association between IAF autonomy and co-sourcing fees paid only holds where IAF is 
voluntary.  
 
          Keywords: Internal audit, Internal audit function, Co-sourcing, Fees, IAF focus, IAF expertise, IAF autonomy, Mandatory, Voluntary.    
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1. Introduction 
The shift that internal audit functions (IAFs) have experienced from assurance to 
consulting activities in many firms (Allegrini et al., 2011; Soh and Martinov-Bonnie, 
2015) has increased the importance of internal audit in firms’ organizations (Speklé et 
al., 2007), as more consulting-oriented IAFs are better able to enhance corporate 
governance through their relationships with the audit committee, the management 
and the external auditors (Gramling et al., 2004; Hazem and Roberts, 2018). To 
respond to the increasing importance of IAFs in firms’ corporate governance, 
firms can choose to develop the required internal audit  skills and abilities inside 
an organization, or to adopt the strategy of co-sourcing internal audit activities 
(Selim et al., 2009). In a typical co-sourcing arrangement, responsibilities for the 
IAF remain inside the organization. However, through co-sourcing, the IAF is likely 
to obtain, from the outside of the organization, special expertise and skills that may be 
difficult to achieve inside an organization due to limited resources available or limited 
employees’ skills. The most common services that are likely to be co-sourced are 
typically reviews of internal control activities, or testing processes related to financial 
reporting, risk management, and regulatory compliance (Carey et al., 2006). Through 
co-sourcing, internal auditing can maximize internal audit activities without hiring 
new employees, or without substantially increasing the corresponding expenses 
(Dame, 2000). Accordingly, prior studies focusing on co-sourcing of internal auditing 
suggest that the primary reasons to co-source is to gain efficiency, to save costs 
(Abdolmohammadi, 2013), and to further increase flexibility and expertise when 
needed the most (Van Peursem and Jiang, 2008). 
This study examines co-sourcing between internal audit of an organization and 
external audit firms. Previous empirical studies analyze variables that may lead firm’s 
organization to use co-sourcing to develop their internal audit activities. For example, 
characteristics related to the size or the location of an organization (Widener and 
Selto, 1999; Abdolmohammadi, 2013), asset specificity and frequency (Speklé et al., 
2007; Widener and Selto, 1999), ownership (Diaz-Mora and Triguero-Cano, 2012) 
and audit committee activities (Abbott et al., 2007; Abdolmohammadi, 2013) are 
expected to be considered by the management of a firm in deciding whether to use co-
sourcing for internal activities. Other studies (Ahlawat and Lowe, 2004; Gramling and 
Vandervelde, 2006) examine the results obtained through co-sourcing, rather than 
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firms’ characteristics that may lead to co-sourcing-related decisions. For example, 
Dickins and O’Reilly (2009) find a positive association between the percentage of co-
sourced internal audit work and the frequency of material weaknesses in internal 
control. They also find a negative relationship between the likelihood of the internal 
auditor reporting to the audit committee and the level of internal auditing co-sourcing. 
However, previous studies have analyzed the determinants of co-sourcing by using 
internal audit or firm characteristics that are observable from outside the firm, without 
considering characteristics such as the focus of an IAF (such as consulting vs. 
assurance activities), its expertise, or its autonomy from the management. Also, these 
previous studies do not take into account how the determinants of the co-sourcing 
decision may depend on whether the IAF is mandated by law and regulations. 
Although there may not be significant differences in the IAF characteristics for firms 
in countries with voluntary or mandatory IAF implementation, the effect of IAF 
characteristics over co-sourcing may differ in alternative institutional contexts. In a 
context where IAF is mandatory, co-sourcing may be mainly motivated by receiving 
assistance to achieve requirements from laws and regulations. On the contrary, in a 
context where IAF is voluntary, co-sourcing may be due to the need of strengthening 
corporate governance in a context of agency theory, where internal audit may serve as 
a monitoring response to agency costs (Carey et al., 2000). 
In this study, we analyze how IAF characteristics that are observed inside an 
organization may have an influence on the co-sourcing decision. In particular, we 
consider (1) IAFs that are more focused on either consulting or assurance activities, 
(2) IAF expertise, which takes into account the expertise of internal audit employees 
acquired both outside and inside an organization, and (3) IAF autonomy, which 
measures to what extent internal audit activities are constrained by the management 
and by a limited number of sources to establish the audit plan (the lower the 
constrains, the higher the autonomy). We argue that, when the IAF is more focused on 
consulting activities, rather than on assurance activities, the IAF needs more 
specialized non-routine co-sourcing assistance. We also argue that IAF expertise 
decreases the need for co-sourcing, as more expert IAF employees are less likely to 
ask for external auditors’ assistance in internal audit activities. Finally, we expect that 
more autonomous IAFs are likely to increase support from external auditors for their 
activities, as more autonomous IAFs are less subject to constrains from the 
management or from other specific areas of the organization. Therefore, more 
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autonomous IAFs are likely to need further external assistance to comply with 
unregulated activities to serve both management and the audit committee (which IAFs 
normally refer to). Besides discussing the association between IAF characteristics and 
co-sourcing, we also analyze the effect that the mandatory or voluntary 
implementation of IAFs may have on the association between IAF characteristics and 
co-sourcing fees paid to support internal audit activities. Because, to our knowledge, 
this issue has been unexplored in previous literature, we adopt, in our hypotheses 
development, an exploratory approach, supposing that there are no differences in the 
associations between IAF characteristics and co-sourcing fees to support internal 
audit activities depending on different institutional contexts. 
To test our hypotheses, we use the Common Body of Knowledge (CBOK) 2015 
study conducted by the Institute of Internal Auditors Research Foundation (IIARF) in 
2015. This database provides characteristics of internal audit that are evaluated inside 
an organization and, more specifically, by internal audit employees. Our sample 
includes 393 companies in 8 different geographic areas, and our results confirm our 
expectations. Specifically, we find a positive association between IAFs focusing more 
on consulting activities and co-sourcing, and between IAF autonomy and co-sourcing. 
Our results also indicate a negative association between the level of IAF expertise and 
co-sourcing. With regards to the role of mandatory or voluntary IAF, we find that 
IAFs focusing on consulting activities, rather than on assurance activities, are likely to 
increase co-sourcing to support internal audit activities, regardless of whether internal 
audit is mandatory or voluntary. IAF expertise is likely to decrease co-sourcing fees 
to support internal audit activities only in firms where IAF is mandatory. We interpret 
this result by observing that greater expertise of IAF employees can help internal 
audit comply with specific requirements of laws and regulations without the need for 
support from external audit co-sourcing. Finally, the positive association between IAF 
autonomy and co-sourcing fees to support internal audit activities only holds when 
internal audit is voluntary. This result can be explained by arguing that the voluntary 
implementation of an IAF allows internal audit employees to operate without legal 
requirements. In this context, more autonomous IAFs, which already comply with 
their tasks without pressures from managers or from limited sources to establish an 
audit plan, are likely to operate with more unregulated activities that are not defined 
by laws and regulations, thus further increasing the need for support from co-sourced 
external auditors. 
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Our results contribute to prior research in several ways. First, to test our 
hypotheses, we use characteristics that are observed inside an organization, and not by 
using measures of internal audit, such as age of employees, internal audit 
certifications, or organizational characteristics, that are normally observable outside 
the firm. The characteristics we analyze are concerned with the audit plan and risk 
areas (IAF focus), with employees’ education and certifications related to internal 
audit, IAF tenure, internal development of activities, and managerial rotation in the 
IAF (IAF expertise), and with the sources used to establish an internal audit audit plan 
and pressures to modify findings and reports of the internal department (IAF 
autonomy). To test our expectations, we also use a holistic approach, using measures 
of IAF focus, IAF expertise, and IAF autonomy that are composite measures of 
individual IAF characteristics. This approach, which is usual in corporate governance 
literature, allows us to decrease the noise that individual measures are likely to 
contain (Larcker et al., 2007). Second, we contribute to internal auditing and co-
sourcing literature by providing evidence that the association between IAF 
characteristics and co-sourcing fees to support internal audit activities is different in 
organizations having mandatory or voluntary IAFs, which may affect the 
interpretation of the results in previous studies. Finally, this study contributes to 
corporate governance literature by examining the characteristics of internal audit and 
co-sourcing fees across countries. The results potentially show the internal audit 
determinants of co-sourcing not just from one country, but from a broader 
international level. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 develops the 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes our dataset, the research design, and the definition of 
our variables. Section 4 reports and discusses the results. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Hypotheses development 
In this section, we develop hypotheses about the effects that internal audit 
characteristics are likely to have on co-sourcing fees. Then, we analyze how these 
associations between internal audit characteristics and co-sourcing fees may change, 
depending on whether internal audit is mandatory or voluntary, according to laws and 
regulations of the geographic regions where firms are domiciled. 
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2.1. IAF characteristics and co-sourcing fees to support internal audit activities 
In recent years, internal auditing has evolved by providing more consulting than 
assurance activities (Allegrini et al., 2011), and internal audit practitioners expect 
internal audit to be even less focused on operational and compliance audits and audits 
of financial risks, and more focused on consulting activities such as corporate 
governance, enterprise risk management, strategic reviews, social and sustainability 
audits and ethics audits during the upcoming years (Allegrini et al., 2011; Soh and 
Martinov-Bennie, 2015). This internal audit’s shift from assurance to consulting 
activities may accelerate the use of co-sourcing, because external firms providing 
assistance to internal audit are normally considered as able to provide the latest 
technological resources, industry specialization and experienced professionals to 
assist IAFs (Carey et al., 2006). However, Powell (1997) suggests that the high staff 
turnover and the employment of junior staff, which are recurrent in big firms 
providing external services, might compromise internal audit quality (Carey et al., 
2006). Also, external providers do not have specific information about customers as 
firms demanding for co-sourcing might have, thus further decreasing the efficiency of 
co-sourced internal control (Barr and Chang, 1993). 
We hypothesize that, when internal audit is more concentrated on consulting 
activities, rather than on assurance activities, it will be more likely to pay higher co-
sourcing fees to external auditors to support internal audit activities. Our expectation 
is in line with Widener and Selto (1999), who find that the co-sourcing of non-routine 
internal audit activities is more costly than the co-sourcing of routine tasks. Thus, our 
hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H1: IAFs with a greater focus on consulting activities are associated with higher 
co-sourcing fees to support internal audit activities. 
 
Another characteristic of the IAF that is likely to lead to co-sourcing decisions of 
internal audit activities is represented by the expertise of IAF employees. We take 
into account the professional expertise of the internal audit employees that they 
obtained both outside the firm, through their education and through the internal 
audit certifications they obtained, and inside the organization, through the number 
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of years IAF has been taken place within a firm (IAF tenure), the management 
training ground, and the ability of IAFs to develop their activities internally.  
The professional expertise internal audit employees can obtain through their 
education and through certifications related to internal audit is likely to have an 
effect on the quality of internal control. In fact, higher financial expertise is likely 
to reduce the incidence of internal control problems (Krishan, 2005) and the 
disclosure of material weaknesses (Lin et al., 2011). Because financial expertise has 
a positive impact on the quality of internal controls, we may expect higher external 
financial expertise to reduce the need for IAFs to co-source their activities, as the 
employees already have the skills to efficiently run their activities.  
The expertise of internal audit employees can be increased also internally. With 
regards to the tenure of an IAF, Carey et al. (2006) find that most of the companies 
that decided to outsource internal audit activities did not have an in-house internal 
department before that decision. Also, Mohammed et al. (2012) find that an 
increasing IAF tenure leads to more mature and competent IAFs. This result might 
be interpreted as more experienced IAFs not needing as much support as 
unexperienced IAFs.  
While it may be argued that greater IAF tenure increases IAF experience and, 
thus, decreases the need for co-sourcing IAF activities, it can be observed that firms 
reporting an internal audit department may also decide to co-source part of IAF 
activities, especially in larger organizations where the complexity of internal audit 
is higher (Carey et al., 2006). To increase the IAF experience on how to deal with 
complex situations, practices such as the management training ground that are 
common in countries such as US may be implemented. The management training 
ground can be defined as “a company targeting internal auditors for hire into 
management positions outside of the IAF” (Messier et al., 2011, page 2132). 
Although internal auditors are viewed by external auditors as less objective when 
an IAF is used as a management training because internal auditors are likely to bias 
their work to meet managers’ expectations (Messier et al., 2011), internal auditors 
may also be perceived as competent, as managers have the opportunity to better 
evaluate internal auditors’ ability (Brown, 1983; Galloway, 1995; Gramling et al., 
2004). Also, through the management training ground, internal auditors are 
expected to increase their interaction with the management of the organization. 
According to this alternative view of management training ground increasing 
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internal auditors’ competence, co-sourcing may be considered as a loss of 
opportunity to implement the training program and, thus, to increase internal 
auditors’ knowledge about the whole organization (Barr and Chang, 1993; Adams, 
1994). Following the stream of literature arguing that the management training 
ground would increase IAF’s knowledge about an organization, we expect it to 
improve internal auditors’ experience inside an organization. 
Finally, IAF experience inside an organization is also likely to be determined by 
the ability of internal audit to develop its activities internally. External auditors’ 
perception of an IAF is expected to change depending on whether internal audit 
activities are developed externally or internally (Abbott at el., 2012), as the more 
internal audit activities are developed internally, the higher the IAF experience. By 
developing internal audit activities internally, internal auditors are able to acquire 
knowledge about risk management and internal control, and to strengthen appropriate 
inter-personal and behavioral skills inside an organization (Sarens et al., 2009). 
By taking into account all the previous considerations about IAF expertise 
developed both outside and inside an organization, we expect that IAF expertise is 
likely to decrease co-sourcing fees to support internal audit activities. We thus 
formulate the second hypothesis as follows: 
 
H2: IAFs with greater expertise are associated with lower co-sourcing fees to 
support internal audit activities. 
 
Another IAF characteristic that is likely to have an influence on fees paid to 
support internal audit activities is IAF autonomy. To remain autonomous, IAF would 
seek to avoid any actions that violate their independence. The importance of IAF 
autonomy to preserve its independence is also demanded by the Institute of Internal 
Auditors (IIA), which requires internal auditors to be objective and independent in 
performing their activities (IIA 2015). To be objective, an IAF needs to be less 
influenced by managers or specific tasks determined by limited sources to establish an 
audit plan, so that the IAF is more likely to find and report internal control problems 
to the audit committee (Lin et al., 2011). Therefore, to better perform their activities, 
internal auditors must remain unbiased (Norman et al., 2010). 
An IAF is more likely to remain autonomous when the IAF uses several sources 
when establishing an audit plan. Because IAFs can be generally involved in a wide 
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range of activities not necessarily or exclusively related to financial reporting, such as 
operational and system audits, or internal consulting related to firm’s projects (Prawitt 
et al., 2009), we expect that a broader range of IAF activities, represented by several 
sources used in establishing the audit plan, is more likely to require greater external 
support through co-sourcing. 
IAF autonomy is also likely to increase when internal auditors are able to report 
their findings in internal audit reports without pressures from the management. Also, 
internal control deficiencies are more likely to be detected when internal audit reports 
directly to the audit committee rather than to management (Bedard and Graham, 
2011). 
IAFs that are more effective in finding material weaknesses, as internal audit  
employees are not pressured or influenced by the management when reporting the 
findings, and can use multiple sources to establish the audit plan, may ask for co-
sourcing to support internal audit activities. The co-sourcing of some internal audit 
activities may further increase the chance of detecting material weaknesses, especially 
in those environments where managers’ pressure is lower. Thus, we expect that more 
autonomous IAFs may require greater support from co-sourcing activities, which in 
turns is translated into higher fees. We formulate, then, our third hypothesis as 
follows: 
 
H3: IAFs with greater levels of autonomy are associated with higher co-
sourcing fees to support internal audit activities. 
 
2.2. IAF characteristics and co-sourcing fees to support internal audit activities in 
different institutional contexts 
Although we expect focus, expertise, and autonomy of IAFs to have an influence 
on the level of co-sourcing for internal audit activities, the associations we defined in 
our hypotheses may suffer changes depending on whether the IAF is voluntary or 
mandatory for specific organizations in a given institutional context. While there is a 
wide range of empirical literature about the substitution or complementary effect 
between internal and external audit activities (Elliot and Korpi, 1978; Stein et al., 
1994; Carey et al., 2000; Felix et al., 2001; Hay et al., 2006; Hay et al., 2008; Ho and 
Hutchinson, 2010; Prawitt et al., 2011; Mohamed et al., 2012), there are no studies, to 
  10 
our knowledge, examining the relationship between IAF characteristics and co-
sourcing, depending on whether the IAF is voluntary or mandatory. 
The IAF implementation in specific organizations can be voluntary or mandatory, 
depending on the institutional context of countries where firms are domiciled. In 
countries where IAF is mandatory, IAF implementation is likely to be motivated by 
applying legal requirements. However, often the implementation of an IAF is required 
only for listed companies. Also, the details of IAF implementation are often not 
determined by laws or regulations. For example, in the New York Stock Exchange, 
where IAF is mandatory, laws and regulations do not require specific professional 
qualifications, or do not define the scopes of the IAF (Chambers and Odar, 2015). 
Finally, some countries apply restrictions to co-sourcing internal audit activities. For 
example, co-sourcing of internal audit to incumbent external auditors is forbidden in 
US under SOX 2002, because it may result in significant economic bonding (Abbott 
et al., 2007). Therefore, such services are provided in US by non-incumbent external 
audit firms or by non-audit firms specialized in services related to internal audit 
activities. 
In environments where internal audit is voluntary, firms’ response to pressure for 
monitoring is often explained through agency theory. According to this theory, IAF is 
considered as a cost borne by managers (agents) to satisfy owners’ (principals’) 
demands to increase firms’ accountability and, therefore, to reduce information 
asymmetries (Sherer and Kent, 1983; Sarens and Abdolmohammadi, 2011). For 
example, Wallace and Kreutzfeld (1991) find that firms with implemented IAFs have 
more skilled management and accounting personnel, and larger, more competitive, 
more profitable and more conservative accounting policies, compared to firms 
without IAF in US. However, Carey et al. (2000) study external and internal auditing 
in Australian family firms and find that variables related to the agency theory do not 
explain the existence of IAF in voluntary environments. Al-Twaijry et al. (2003) find 
that Saudi companies do not voluntarily implement IAF motivated by the reliance on 
external auditors or by the cost-benefit trade-off. Finally, Goodwin-Steward and Kent 
(2006) find that, in Australian companies, there is a strong association between 
voluntary internal audit and the size of the firm. However, they do not find any 
relation between voluntary IAF and the complexity of business structures, while they 
obtain mixed results for the voluntary use of internal audit as a way to strengthen 
corporate governance mechanisms.  
  11 
Although previous literature analyzing internal audit across countries on a macro 
level observes that the variability in professional qualifications may partially be 
explained by cultural differences (Sarens and Abdolmohammadi, 2010) and by the 
degree of the economic development of a country (Abdolhommadi and Tucker, 2002), 
the association between IAF characteristics and external auditing to support internal 
audit activities depending on whether IAF is voluntary or mandatory has not been 
explored yet. Although we believe that this association is likely to change according 
to different institutional contexts, the lack of a related theoretical background leads us 
to formulate the corresponding hypotheses supposing no differences between 
mandatory and voluntary IAFs. Therefore, our fourth hypotheses are as follows: 
 
H4a: The positive association between IAF focusing on consulting activities and 
co-sourcing fees to support internal audit activities is expected to hold in both 
mandatory and voluntary IAFs. 
 
H4b: The negative association between IAF expertise and co-sourcing fees to 
support internal audit activities is expected to hold in both mandatory and 
voluntary IAFs. 
 
H4c: The positive association between IAF autonomy and co-sourcing fees to 
support internal audit activities is expected to hold in both mandatory and 
voluntary IAFs. 
 
3. Data, methods, and variable definitions 
3.1. Data 
This study is based on data provided by the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) 
from the series of surveys known as the Common Body of Knowledge (CBOK). The 
CBOK 2015 survey, which was the third global initiative of its kind, was offered to 
the members of IIA world widely in 23 languages. The data provided included 14,517 
respondents from 166 countries. The respondents work in organizations in different 
industries and firm sizes with a differing range of activities. To test our hypotheses, 
we require that all the firms in our sample have an IAF and paid fees to external 
auditors to support internal audit activities, because firms not having an IAF or not 
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declaring whether they paid fees to external auditors cannot show evidence about the 
hypotheses analyzed in this study. In the dataset, the variable with the smallest 
number of observations is co-sourcing fees paid to external auditors to support 
internal audit activities, as this variable is available in 839 observations. Because we 
require all the observations to have available data for all the variables we include in 
the model, and after winsorizing variables at 1% and 99% as it is common to avoid 
the effect of outliers, we finally obtain 393 observations (174 related to voluntary 
internal audit, and 219 related to mandatory internal audit) from eight different 
geographic areas (Africa, Asia, Pacific, Europe, Middle East, North America, South 
and Central America, and the Caribbean). Table 1 reports the number of firms in our 
sample for each country, classified according to the geographic area. 
 
3.2. Research design 
To test the associations between co-sourcing fees paid to external auditors to 
support internal audit activities and IAF characteristics, we use the following model: 
 
𝐶𝑜 − 𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑠(ln)𝑖𝑡
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐼𝐴𝐹𝑓𝑜𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝐴𝐹𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝐴𝐹𝑎𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡
+∑𝛽𝑗 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑗,𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
          (1) 
 
We run Equation (1) by using the ordinary least-square (OLS) estimation. To 
control for the effects that geographical regions of firms’ incorporation are likely to 
have on co-sourcing fees, we include region dummies among the control variables. 
The dependent variable, Co-sourcingFees(ln), is fees paid by an organization to co-
source internal audit activities with the external auditors. The CBOK (2015) question 
used is "What were last year's approximate fees paid to external auditors to support or 
perform internal audit work?”, and the variable used in our tests is the natural 
logarithm of co-sourcing fees paid to external auditors to support internal audit  
activities.   
 The three independent variables of interest are IAFfocus, IAFexpertise, and 
IAFautonomy. These three variables are composite measures of IAF characteristics. In 
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particular, IAFfocus includes the percentage of the audit plan that has been made 
taking into account several categories of risks (Audit plan), and the kind of 
responsibilities IAF has inside the organizations (Risk areas). IAFexpertise indicates 
external expertise, which includes education and an internal audit certification, and 
internal expertise, which incorporates the years IAF has been taken place in firms’ 
organization (Tenure), the ability of IAF to develop its activities internally (Internal), 
and managerial rotation in the IAF (Rotation). Finally, IAFautonomy is measured 
through the number of sources that are used to establish an audit plan (Source), and 
through the pressure IAF has suffered to change or suppress a valid internal audit 
report or finding (Modify). We run Equation (1) by using both the composite 
measures, and their individual components. 
Controls indicates the control variables, that include existence and characteristics 
of audit committees, the mandatory requirement for organizations of the existence of 
an internal audit department, the number of employees, the natural logarithm of total 
assets, and the natural logarithm of sales. Also, due to heavy legal requirements, firms 
in regulated industries may be more subject to perform their internal audit activities 
in-house rather than to co-source them to external service providers. For this reason, 
we also control for dummy variables representing different industries the firms in our 
sample belong to. 
Finally, to analyze whether the mandatory incorporation of an IAF has an effect on 
the association between IAF characteristics and co-sourcing fees paid to support 
internal audit activities, we run Equation (1) separately for two portfolios of 
observations, depending on whether IAF is mandatory or voluntary for a specific 
organization, according to laws and regulations of firms’ region of domiciliation. 
 
3.3. Variable definitions 
To analyze the effects that IAF characteristics are likely to have on co-sourcing 
fees paid to support internal audit activities, we take into account three IAF composite 
measures: IAF focus, IAF expertise, and IAF autonomy. As it is usual in the corporate 
governance literature (Larcker et al., 2007), the use of variables that include different 
dimensions of internal audit is expected to decrease the noise that individual proxies 
might contain if used alone. Next, we describe the three IAF composite measures, 
along with the individual proxies used to compute them. The description of the IAF 
composite measures is also summarized in Table 2. 
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IAF focus measures whether the internal audit department is more focused on 
assurance or consulting activities. The two proxies that are included in our variable of 
IAF focus are audit plan and risk areas. Audit plan reflects the percentage of 2015 
audit plan that has been made up of several categories of risk. Our proxy is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 if the sum of the audit plan percentages related to 
strategic business risks, risk management assurance/effectiveness, information 
technology not covered in other audits, third-party relationships, crisis management, 
and general financing, which can all be considered as consulting activities, is greater 
than (or equal to) 50 percent, and 0 otherwise. The variable Risk areas identifies the 
responsibilities related to risk that internal audit has in the organization. The 
dichotomous variable takes the value of 1 if, according to the respondents of the 
survey, the IAF provides advice and consulting on risk management activities, and 0 
if employees believe that internal audit provides assurance on individual risks and on 
risk management as a whole. The variable IAF focus is the sum of the two 
dichotomous variables listed above. Thus, IAF focus is a discrete variable that can 
take a value from 0 to 2. The higher the value, the more the IAF is focused on 
consulting activities. 
IAF expertise is measured by considering both the level of expertise employees 
may have acquired outside the organization, and the expertise accumulated inside the 
organization. For external expertise, we take into account employees’ Education and 
Certification. Education is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the employee 
holds a Master or a Doctorate degree, and 0 otherwise. Certification takes the value of 
1 if employees hold a certification related to IA, and 0 otherwise. The variable IAF 
external expertise is the sum of the two variables above. Also, we measure internal 
expertise through a composite measure of the following three variables: Tenure, 
Internal, and Rotation. With regard to IAF tenure, we expect that the higher the 
number of years IAF has taken place inside an organization, the higher the IAF 
expertise referred to that organization. The related dichotomous variable takes the 
value of 1 if the number of years is greater than (or equal to) the median of the years, 
computed by geographic region, and 0 otherwise. The variable Internal analyzes the 
ability of the IAF to develop its activities internally. In particular, the variable takes 
the value of 1 if internal audit activities are provided inside the organization, and 0 
otherwise. Finally, organizations favoring managers’ rotation inside the IAF is likely 
to increase its expertise. Thus, the related dichotomous variable (Rotation) takes the 
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value of 1 if the organization has a process to rotate, formally or informally, managers 
into the IAF, and 0 otherwise. The variable IAF internal expertise is the sum of the 
three dichotomous variables listed above. Thus, our composite measure can take a 
discrete value from 0 to 3. In our tests, we also use the variable IAF expertise, which 
is the sum of external and internal expertise. 
For IAF autonomy, which measures the absence of constrains to the IAFs from the 
management and from other specific areas of the organization in complying with their 
tasks, we take into account the variables Source and Modify. Source measures the 
number of sources that are used to establish an audit plan. There are ten different 
sources listed in the survey, such as previous year’s audit plan, compliance or 
regulatory requirements, organizations’ strategies and objectives, consultation with 
external auditors business heads, or requests from management, audit committee, or 
external auditors. It can be argued that the higher the number of sources that are used, 
the more autonomous is the IAF. Because the median of this variable is 5, our 
variable Source takes the value of 1 if the number of sources is greater than 5, and 0 
otherwise. The variable Modify considers whether the IAF experienced a situation in 
which employees were directed to suppress, or significantly modify, a valid internal 
audit finding or report. The corresponding variable (Modify) takes the value of 1 if 
respondent never experienced such a pressure, and 0 otherwise. The variable IAF 
autonomy is the sum of the two dummy variables above and, thus, can take a value 
from 0 to 2. 
 
In Equation (1), we use control variables that are likely to have an influence on the 
co-sourcing fees paid to external auditors to support internal audit activities. To take 
into account the importance of audit committee characteristics on IAFs (Goodwin, 
2003; Krishnan, 2005; Zain et al., 2006; Abdulaziz, 2015), we also construct a 
composite measure that takes into account three dimensions of firms’ audit 
committees. First, we consider the existence of an audit committee in an organization. 
The corresponding dichotomous variable takes the value of 1 if there is an audit 
committee or equivalent in the organization, and 0 otherwise. Second, we consider the 
number of meetings that the audit committee approximately had in the last fiscal year. 
The related dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the number of meetings of the 
audit committee is greater than the median, computed by industry and region, and 0 
otherwise. Finally, we take into account whether the chief audit executive (CAE) or 
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director were invited to an audit committee meeting. The corresponding dummy 
variable takes the value of 1 if the number of meetings CAE or director were invited 
to is higher than the median, computed by industry and region, and 0 otherwise. Our 
composite measure for audit committee is the sum of the three dichotomous variables 
above and, thus, can take a discreet value from 0 (no audit committee in an 
organization) to 3. Mandatory is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the 
internal audit department is mandatory for an organization according to laws and 
regulations, and 0 otherwise. To take into account IAF size, we include in the model 
the number of fulltime equivalent employees in the internal audit department. Finally, 
we control for firm size through the natural logarithm of total assets and the natural 




4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics. Audit plan has a mean equal to 0.3664, and 
a median equal to 0. The number of observations reporting a value of Audit plan equal 
to 1 is 144, corresponding to the 36.64% of the sample. This suggests that, in most of 
the firms in our sample, the audit plan has been made up mainly taking into account 
the assurance activities. However, when we consider the responsibilities that internal 
audit members have in internal audit, the 57,51% of our sample (corresponding to 226 
observations) reports a value of Risk areas equal to 1, indicating that, in most of the 
firms, IAF provides consulting on risk management activities. While most of the 
respondents (59.03% of the sample, which corresponds to 232 observations) hold a 
Master or a Doctorate degree, as indicated by the mean of the variable Education, 
56.49% of the employees in the survey have a certificate related to IA. With regard to 
IAF tenure, 167 observations (42.49% of the sample) reports a value equal to 1 and 
correspond to firms having IAF for a number of years greater than the median, 
computed by geographic region. The descriptive statistics related to the variables 
Internal and Rotation also indicate that most of the firms have low levels of internal 
expertise (the means of the two variables are 0.3359 and 0.2188, respectively). In fact, 
132 observations (33.59% of the sample) develop their activities internally, and only 
86 observations (21.88% of the sample) experience an organization favoring 
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managers’ rotation inside the IAF. Most of the firms have autonomous IAF 
characteristics. 225 observations (57.25% of the sample) report a value of Source 
equal to 1, suggesting that most of the firms use a high number of sources to establish 
their audit plan, and 351 observations (89.31% of the sample) report a value of 
Modify equal to 1, indicating that most of the firms never experienced pressures to 
modify or suppress a valid internal audit finding or report. The median of Audit 
committee is equal to 3, indicating that most of the firms (83.21% of the sample) 
report an existing audit committee in their organization. Finally, descriptive statistics 
about the variable Mandatory report a mean equal to 0.5573 and a median equal to 1, 
indicating that most of the companies in our sample have compulsory implementation 
of an IAF, according to laws and regulations of the country they are domiciled in. 
Table 4 reports the correlation matrix. The negative and significant correlation 
between Co-sourcing fees (ln) and Internal indicates that co-sourcing fees paid to 
support internal audit activities are reduced when internal audit activities are 
developed internally, while the positive correlation between Co-sourcing fees (ln) and 
Source suggests that fees paid to support internal audit activities tend to increase 
when the number of sources to establish the internal audit plan increases. This 
positive correlation may be due to higher complexity of internal audit when the 
number of sources increases, which is likely to lead to higher co-sourcing fees to 
support internal audit. The negative and significant correlation between Risk areas 
and Modify suggests that responsibilities in advice and consulting activities are lower 
when organizations are less pressured to modify a valid internal audit finding or 
report. The negative and significant correlation between Certification and Internal 
may suggest a negative effect between the ability of IAF employees to develop 
internal audit activities internally and the requirement of an internal audit certification 
that firms may demand to their employees. Also, the negative and significant 
correlation between Certification and Modify indicates that those employees with 
higher external expertise are those that experienced less pressure in suppressing 
and/or modifying a valid internal audit finding or report. The positive and significant 
correlation between Tenure and Mandatory indicates that IAFs are taken place for a 
higher number of years when internal audit is mandatory by country laws or 
regulations. The negative and significant correlation between Internal and Source 
suggests that an IAF develops its activities internally when there are less different 
sources used to establish an internal audit plan. Finally, the positive correlation 
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between Audit committee and Co-sourcing fees indicates that stronger audit 
committee characteristics require higher co-sourcing fees, while the positive 
correlation between Audit committee and Mandatory suggests that audit committees 
are likely to be stronger when IAF is mandatory. 
We also run correlations using the composite measures of IAF characteristics, 
instead of the individual items. Untabulated coefficients show that there is no 
significant correlation between co-sourcing fees and any of the composite measures, 
except for IAF autonomy, which reports a positive and significant correlation, 
supporting Hypothesis 3. There is also a negative and significant correlation between 
external and internal expertise, and a positive and significant correlation between 
IAFs that are more consulting-oriented and IAF expertise, which include both 
external and internal expertise, suggesting that IAFs that are more oriented towards 
consulting activities are also those that require a higher level of expertise of its 
employees. 
Finally, the high correlation between the natural logarithms of total assets and sales 
(0.6596) may imply a multicollinearity problem in our empirical model. To address 
this concern, we compute the variance inflation factors (VIFs) of both of the 
variables, which are equal to 2.37 for Total assets (ln), and 2.35 for Sales (ln). These 
values indicate a low magnitude of multicollinearity. To further exclude any 
multicollinearity issue, we also run Equation (1) by excluding either Total assets (ln) 
or Sales (ln) from the list of independent variables, and the main results remain stable.  
 
4.2. The determinants of co-sourcing fees paid to support internal audit activities 
Table 5 analyzes the determinants of co-sourcing fees. After including all the 
variables in the model, the number of observations is 393. Column (1) reports results 
when the components of IAF focus, IAF expertise, and IAF autonomy are included 
separately in the model, while Column (2) refers to results when IAF focus, IAF 
expertise (differentiated into external and internal expertise), and IAF autonomy are 
included as composite measures. In both columns, Mandatory, Audit committee, the 
size of IAFs (number of employees) and the size of firms (in terms of sales) report a 
positive and significant association with co-sourcing fees paid to assist internal audit. 
With regard to the individual components of IAF focus, Table 5, Column (1), 
shows that the more the audit plan is dedicated to consulting activities (variable: Audit 
plan), the higher the co-sourcing fees firms are likely to pay to support internal audit 
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activities (coef. 0.3277, p-value 0.031). Risk areas, on the contrary, does not report a 
significant association with co-sourcing fees at conventional levels. Education and 
Certification, which are individual components of external expertise, have no 
significant associations with co-sourcing fees, while Tenure, which is a component of 
IAF internal expertise, report a negative and significant coefficient (coef. -0.2641, p-
value 0.089). The variable Rotation, which is also a component of IAF external 
expertise, is not related to co-sourcing fees at conventional levels. Finally, between 
the two dimensions of IAF autonomy (Source and Modify), only the variable Source 
reports a positive and significant coefficient (coef. 0.2943, p-value 0.042).  
 When we include in the model the composite measures of IAF characteristics 
(Table 5, Column (2)), IAF focus reports a positive and significant association with 
the dependent variable (coef. 0.2781, p-value 0.014), supporting the idea that, when 
the IAF is more oriented towards consulting activities, organizations are willing to 
pay higher co-sourcing fees to support internal audit activities. The composite 
measure of IAF external expertise is negative, but not significant at conventional 
levels. The higher expertise employees may have earned outside the firm through 
higher education levels of internal audit certifications does not significantly reduce 
co-sourcing fees. This unexpected result may be explained by arguing that, although 
employees with higher educational and auditing background may require less external 
support to develop their activities, they may also better understand the issues related 
to internal audit and, thus, they may want internal audit activities to be further 
improved, also by increasing the activities provided through co-sourcing. The 
composite measure related to internal expertise, however, reports a negative and 
significant association with co-sourcing fees (coef. -0.1804, p-value 0.072). This 
significant association suggests that employees that achieved higher levels of 
expertise inside an organization are also those that are more likely to rely less on 
external assistance. We also run Equation (1) by using only one proxy of expertise, 
which is the sum of internal and external expertise, and the corresponding 
(untabulated) coefficient is negative and significant (coef. -0.2284, p-value 0.064). 
This is consistent with our expectations of more expert IAFs needing less assistance 
from external auditors (Hypothesis H2). Finally, more autonomous IAFs are likely to 
increase co-sourcing fees to support internal audit activities, as indicated by the 
positive and significant coefficient of the composite measure related to IAF autonomy 
(coef. 0.2216, p-value 0.078). This result supports Hypothesis 3 regarding the 
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expected positive association between more autonomous IAFs and fees paid to assist 
the IAF. 
In Table 6, we report results by creating two portfolios of observations: one with 
firms with mandatory implementation of an IAF for an organization, and one with 
firms with voluntary implementation of an IAF. Columns (1) and (2) report results 
when IAF is not mandatory and mandatory, respectively, and include the individual 
components of IAF focus, expertise, and autonomy, separately. Columns (3) and (4) 
report results when IAF is not mandatory and mandatory, respectively, using the 
composite measures of IAF focus, expertise, and autonomy. 
Results with individual IAF components and with observations of firms with 
voluntary implementation of an IAF (Table 6, Column (1)) indicate that Audit plan 
has a positive and significant association with co-sourcing fees (coef. 0.4076, p-value 
0.092), Tenure is negatively and significantly associated with fees paid to support 
internal audit activities (coef. -0.4616, p-value 0.073), and Source reports a positive 
and significant coefficient (coef. 0.6053, p-value 0.023). When IAF is mandatory 
(Table 6, Column (2)), among the individual IAF characteristics, only Risk areas 
reports a positive and significant coefficient, while the other IAF characteristics are 
not significant at conventional levels. 
With regards to the composite measures of IAF characteristics (Table 6, Columns 
(3) and (4)), results suggest that the more the IAF is focused on consulting activities, 
the higher the fees paid to support internal audit activities, regardless of whether IAF 
is mandatory or not. IAF external expertise does not significantly affect co-sourcing 
fees, regardless of whether the IAF is voluntary or mandatory. However, IAF internal 
expertise is likely to decrease co-sourcing fees only when IAF is mandatory (coef. -
0.2619, p-value 0.040), while the association between IAF expertise and co-sourcing 
fees paid is not significant at conventional levels when IAF is voluntary (Table 5, 
Column (3)). The result is similar when we run the same model using IAF expertise 
that incorporates both external and internal expertise, with an untabulated coefficient 
of -0.1806, and with a p-value of 0.060 when IAF is mandatory, and with a coefficient 
that is no longer significant when the IAF is voluntary. Finally, IAF autonomy 
increases co-sourcing fees paid to support internal audit activities only when IAF is 
not mandatory (coef. 0.4941, p-value 0.017), while the same association is no longer 
significant in firms domiciled with mandatory IAF implementation. These results 
indicate that the voluntary or mandatory implementation of the IAF affects the 
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associations between co-sourcing fees paid to support internal audit activities and 
both IAF expertise and IAF autonomy. IAF expertise and, especially, internal 
expertise, is likely to decrease co-sourcing fees only when IAF is mandatory, while 
IAF autonomy increases co-sourcing fees only when IAF is voluntary. 
 
4.3. Discussion of the results 
This study examines the relationship between fees paid by organizations in co-
sourcing internal audit activities and characteristics of the IAF, and how this 
relationship can change in a mandatory or voluntary context of IAF implementation.  
Results confirm our expectations regarding the relationship between IAF 
characteristics and fees paid to support internal audit activities. We find a positive 
association between IAF consulting activities and co-sourcing fees, which is in line 
with the shift from assurance to consulting IAF activities (Allegrini et al., 2011; Soh 
and Martinov-Bennie, 2015) being likely to accelerate the use of co-sourcing. Firms 
reporting consulting-oriented IAFs should, then, tend to increase internal audit 
employees’ expertise if they want to avoid recurring to co-sourcing. In this way, 
internal audit employees would develop skills and abilities that would allow IAFs to 
permanently cope with the complex consulting tasks of an IAF. IAF autonomy has 
also a positive association with co-sourcing fees, as more autonomous IAFs are 
expected to comply with a wider range of activities without constrains from 
management or from a limited number of sources to establish the audit plan. The 
greater level of unregulated activities, which already characterizes internal auditing 
(Prawitt et al., 2009), is likely to increase the need for external support. Although 
greater autonomy of IAFs reduces the constrains for IAFs in their activities, it also 
implies a need for wider skills and abilities, due to the increase of different types of 
activities. To be efficient, more autonomous IAFs should, then, either increase co-
sourcing or, alternatively, increase employees’ expertise. Results also indicate a 
negative association between IAF expertise and, in particular, IAF internal expertise, 
and co-sourcing fees, which is in line with more experienced IAFs being more 
competent (Mohammed et al., 2012) and, thus, needing less external support . 
By analyzing the data in voluntary and mandatory IAF contexts, we find that, 
regardless of the institutional context, IAFs focusing on consulting activities pay 
higher co-sourcing fees to support internal audit activities. IAF expertise decreases 
the co-sourcing fees paid to external auditors only in firms domiciled in regions where 
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IAF is mandatory, especially if expertise has been developed inside an organization. 
This is probably due to more expert IAFs needing less external audit collaboration to 
implement specific laws’ and regulations’ requirements. Thus, in institutional 
environments where the implementation of IAFs is regulated, firms may improve 
internal audit employees’ expertise to permanently comply with laws and regulations, 
rather than pay co-sourcing fees to comply with those legal requirements. Finally, the 
positive association between IAF autonomy and co-sourcing fees only holds in 
geographic regions where internal audit is voluntary, which indicates that the 
voluntary implementation of IAFs further increases the positive association between 
IAF autonomy and co-sourcing. In fact, more autonomous IAFs, which are those that 
comply with their tasks without pressures from managers or from limited sources to 
establish an audit plan, may also operate without legal requirements. Thus, the 
voluntary IAF implementation further increases the range of their unregulated 
activities and, thus, the need for co-sourcing. 
Our results related to the voluntary or mandatory implementation of an IAF have 
implications regarding how external auditors can support internal audit activities. Co-
sourcing is generally able to support IAFs when IAFs have a greater focus on 
consulting (rather than assurance) activities. However, in regions where IAF is 
mandatory, it may be less expensive for firms to invest resources in increasing 
internal audit employees’ expertise to comply with specific requirements from law 
and regulations, rather than paying co-sourcing fees in an environment that, due to 
laws and regulations, is likely to be more standardized. On the contrary, in regions 
where IAFs are voluntary, it may be convenient for firms to pay co-sourcing fees to 
external auditors to support a less standardized volume of tasks, being therefore 
subject to a greater number and complexity of tasks. Thus, we do not suggest that co-
sourcing is always (or never) convenient to firms. Rather, we believe that co-sourcing 
may be useful depending on the characteristics of each IAF, and on the institutional 
environment of each organization. 
 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper, we study the associations between IAF characteristics and co-
sourcing, and how these associations can vary in different institutional contexts. We 
find that more consulting-oriented and more autonomous IAFs are likely to increase 
co-sourcing, while IAFs with more expertise decrease co-sourcing fees paid to 
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external auditors. We also find that more consulting-oriented IAFs are likely to pay 
more co-sourcing fees regardless of the institutional context. However, IAF expertise 
decreases co-sourcing fees only when IAFs are mandatory, while IAFs autonomy 
increases co-sourcing fees only when IAFs are voluntary. The findings have 
implications for firms in optimizing their IAF. 
As in all studies, also this one has its limitations that should be considered when 
interpreting our results. The variables used in the analysis are based on the responses 
of the CBOK 2015 survey participants, who were all internal auditors and members of 
the IIA. This may raise the possibility of a sampling bias. The respondents were 
anonymous and we were not able to check the given answers. Also, the availability of 
further accounting, financial, and corporate governance variables was limited to the 
ones offered in the survey. Although we attempted to match the CBOK dataset with 
other databases, such as Datastream, to increase the number of accounting and 
economic variables we may have used in our empirical models as control variables, 
the number of observations that matched in the two databases was very limited. 
Finally, the questions included in the survey were administrated by the IIARF, which 
had a strong influence on the definition of the variables we used in our research.  
Further research may analyze the association between IAF characteristics and co-
sourcing fees in specific countries where external legal shocks, such as changes in the 
IAF’s requirements, or in the mandatory or voluntary implementation of IAFs in 
specific countries, may increase the heterogeneity of the sample that in our study is 
given by considering several geographic areas. Also, researchers may explore the 
optimal balance between IAF characteristics and co-sourcing fees paid to support 
internal audit activities to minimize managerial opportunistic behaviors in the most 
efficient way. According to our findings, this balance is likely to change depending on 
different institutional contexts and may imply policy implications for regulators in a 
given country to improve the interaction between internal audit and co-sourcing. 
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Table 1 – Countries and sample firms  
Africa: 28 firms 
Botswana 1 South Africa 8 Cote d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast) 2 Swaziland 1 Ghana 1 Tanzania, United Republic of 2 Madagascar 1 Uganda 1 Mauritius 2 Zimbabwe 7 Nigeria 2   
Asia: 60 firms Armenia 1 Malaysia 4 Bangladesh 1 Pakistan 4 China 21 Phillippines 1 India 5 Singapore 1 Indonesia 3 Taiwan 6 Japan 13   
Pacific: 11 firms 
Australia 10 Papua New Guinea 1 
Europe: 108 firms 
Austria 2 Macedonia 1 Belgium 1 Montenegro 1 Croatia 1 Norway 1 Cyprus 1 Poland 3 Czech Republic 3 Portugal 3 Denmark 5 Romania 2 Estonia 1 Russia 1 France 10 Serbia 2 Germany 15 Slovenia 1 Greece 4 Spain 10 Hungary 1 Sweden 2 Iceland 1 Switzerland 22 Italy 4 Turkey 5 Latvia 1 Ukraine 1 Luxembourg 2 United Kingdom 1 Middle East: 27 firms Israel 7 Qatar 1 Kuwait 1 Saudi Arabia 9 Lebanon 1 United Arab Emirates 7 Oman 1   
North America: 95 firms 
Canada 14 United States 81 
South and Central America: 55 firms 
Argentina 5 Honduras 1 Bolivia 1 Mexico 1 Brazil 7 Nicaragua 3 Chile 8 Panama 2 Colombia 6 Paraguay 1 Costa Rica 6 Peru 1 Ecuador 8 Uruguay 1 El Salvador 4   The Caribbean: 9 firms Bahamas 1 Cayman Islands 2 Barbados 1 Dominican Republic 2 Bonaire, Saint Eustatius and Saba 1 Puerto Rico 2 Total: 393   
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Table 2 – Definition of the IAF composite measures  IAF focus Discrete variable, computed as the sum of Audit plan and Risk areas. It can take a value from 0 to 2.   Audit plan Dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if the percentage of consulting-related activities in the 2015 audit plan is greater than (or equal to) 50 percent, and 0 otherwise.   Risk areas Dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if employees believe that the IAF provides advice and consulting on risk management activities, and 0 otherwise.   IAF external expertise Discrete variable, computed as the sum of Education and Certification. It can take a value from 0 to 2.   Education Dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if the employee holds a Master or a Doctorate degree, and 0 otherwise.   Certification Dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if the employee has a professional qualification in internal audit, and 0 otherwise.   IAF internal expertise Discrete variable, computed as the sum of Tenure, Internal, and Rotation. It can take a value from 0 to 3.   Tenure Dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if the number of years internal audit has taken place into an organization is greater than (or equal to) the median of the years, computed by geographic region, and 0 otherwise.   Internal Dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if internal audit activities are developed inside the organization, and 0 otherwise.    Rotation Dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if managers rotate into the IAF, and 0 otherwise.   IAF autonomy Discrete variable, computed as the sum of Source and Modify. It can take a value from 0 to 2.   Source Dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if the number of sources used to establish an audit plan is greater than 5 out of 10 listed sources, and 0 otherwise.   Modify Dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if respondents never experienced pressures to suppress or significantly modify a valid internal audit finding or report, and 0 otherwise.    
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Table 3 - Descriptive statistics 
Variables 25th percentile Mean Median 75th percentile Standard deviation 
Co-sourcing fees (ln) 10.3090 11.3994 11.5129 12.5426 1.6766 
Audit plan 0 0.3664 0 1 0.4824 
Risk areas 0 0.5751 1 1 0.4950 
Education 0 0.5903 1 1 0.4924 
Certification 0 0.5649 1 1 0.4964 
Tenure 0 0.4249 0 1 0.4950 
Internal 0 0.3359 0 1 0.4729 
Rotation 0 0.2188 0 0 0.4140 
Source 0 0.5725 1 1 0.4953 
Modify 1 0.8931 1 1 0.3093 
Mandatory 0 0.5573 1 1 0.4973 
Audit committee 1 1.9924 3 3 1.1834 
Number of employees 2 6.9786 5 9 6.7170 
Total assets (ln) 18.2929 19.9424 20.5608 21.8219 3.0138 
Sales (ln) 17.3120 19.0844 19.5193 21.1287 2.8493 
The number of observations is 393. Co-sourcing fees (ln) is the natural logarithm of co-sourcing fees paid to support IA. Audit plan is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if the percentage of consulting-related activities in the 2015 audit plan is greater than (or equal to) 50 percent, and 0 otherwise. Risk areas is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if employees believe that internal audit provides advice consulting on risk management activities, and 0 otherwise. Education is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the employee holds a Master or a Doctorate degree, and 0 otherwise. Certification is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if the employee has a professional qualification or certification in internal audit, and 0 otherwise.  Tenure is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if the number of years internal audit has taken place is greater than (or equal to) the median of the years, computed by geographic region, and 0 otherwise. Internal is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if internal audit activities are developed inside the organization, and 0 otherwise. Rotation is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if IAF employees rotate though other parts of the organization, and 0 otherwise. Source is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if the number of sources used to establish an audit plan is greater than 5, and 0 otherwise. Modify is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if respondents never experienced a pressure to suppress or significantly modify a valid internal audit finding or report, and 0 otherwise. Mandatory is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if an internal audit department is mandated by law in an organization, and 0 otherwise. Audit committee is a composite measure for 
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audit committee existence and characteristics. Total assets (ln) is the natural logarithm of total assets. Sales (ln) is the natural logarithm of sales. 
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Co-sourcing fees (ln) 1               
Audit plan 0.0445 1              
Risk areas 0.0595 -0.0193 1             
Education -0.0729 0.0644 -0.0043 1            
Certification 0.0751 0.0070 0.0554 -0.0527 1           
Tenure 0.0515 -0.0875 0.0517 -0.0480 0.0588 1          
Internal -0.1546 0.0406 0.0664 -0.0430 -0.1474 -0.0337 1         
Rotation 0.0656 0.0573 0.0815 -0.0221 -0.0196 0.0057 0.0015 1        
Source 0.2737 0.0700 0.1208 -0.0295 0.1650 0.0873 -0.1151 0.0344 1       
Modify 0.0149 -0.0959 -0.0974 0.0300 -0.0876 0.0474 -0.0330 -0.0759 -0.0658 1      
Mandatory 0.0737 0.0080 -0.0408 0.0075 -0.0280 0.1030 -0.0603 0.0009 -0.0143 -0.0430 1     
Audit committee 0.3033 0.0094 0.0162 0.0034 0.1593 -0.0032 -0.1367 0.0399 0.1859 -0.0231 0.1286 1    Number of employees 0.3132 -0.0170 0.0070 -0.0422 0.0775 0.3473 -0.0505 0.1253 0.1979 0.0836 0.1119 0.1940 1   Total assets (ln) 0.4121 0.0210 -0.0579 -0.0660 0.1365 0.1557 -0.1080 -0.0597 0.2022 0.0009 0.0219 0.2037 0.3609 1  
Sales (ln) 0.4462 -0.0159 0.0104 -0.0357 0.0565 0.1094 -0.0867 0.0578 0.2286 0.0228 -0.0455 0.1248 0.3214 0.6596 1 
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 Pairwise Spearman correlations. Correlations in bold are significant at the 10% level.   The number of observations is 393. Co-sourcing fees (ln) is the natural logarithm of co-sourcing fees paid to support IA. Audit plan is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if the percentage of consulting-related activities in the 2015 audit plan is greater than (or equal to) 50 percent, and 0 otherwise. Risk areas is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if employees believe that IAF provides advice consulting on risk management activities, and 0 otherwise. Education is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the employee holds a Master or a Doctorate degree, and 0 otherwise. Certification is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if the employee has a professional qualification or certification in internal audit, and 0 otherwise.  Tenure is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if the number of years internal audit has taken place is greater than (or equal to) the median of the years, computed by geographic region, and 0 otherwise. Internal is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if internal audit activities are developed inside the organization, and 0 otherwise. Rotation is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if IAF employees rotate though other parts of the organization, and 0 otherwise. Source is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if the number of sources used to establish an audit plan is greater than 5, and 0 otherwise. Modify is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if respondents never experienced a pressure to suppress or significantly modify a valid internal audit finding or report, and 0 otherwise. Mandatory is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if an internal audit department is mandated by law in an organization, and 0 otherwise. Audit committee is a composite measure for audit committee existence and characteristics. Total assets (ln) is the natural logarithm of total assets. Sales (ln) is the natural logarithm of sales.  
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Table 5 - The association between IAF characteristics and co-sourcing fees to support internal audit activities  
VARIABLES Co-sourcing fees (ln) t Co-sourcing fees (ln) t 
 Column (1) Column (2) 
   
Intercept 7.7488*** 5.9016*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Audit plan t  0.3277**   (0.031)  
Risk areas t 0.1747   (0.258)  
IAF focus t  0.2781**   (0.014) 
Education t -0.1146   (0.422)  
Certification t -0.0891   (0.558)  
Tenure t -0.2641*   (0.089)  
Internal t -0.2340   (0.148)  
Rotation t 0.0292   (0.886)  
IAF external expertise t  -0.0930   (0.371) 
IAF internal expertise t  -0.1804*   (0.072) 
Source t 0.2943**   (0.042)  
Modify t 0.0803   (0.730)  IAF autonomy t  0.2216*   (0.078) 
Mandatory t 0.3736** 0.3792**  (0.014) (0.011) 
Audit committee t 0.2081*** 0.2213***  (0.002) (0.001) 
Number of employees t 0.0459*** 0.0460***  (0.001) (0.001) 
Total assets (ln) t 0.0663 0.0636 
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 (0.112) (0.121) 
Sales (ln) t 0.1184*** 0.1196***  (0.006) (0.006) 
Region dummies YES YES Industry dummies YES YES 
Observations 393 393 R2 0.407 0.402 The values in brackets report p-value significance levels. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  Co-sourcing fees (ln) is the natural logarithm of co-sourcing fees paid to support IA. Audit plan is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if the percentage of consulting-related activities in the 2015 audit plan is greater than (or equal to) 50 percent, and 0 otherwise. Risk areas is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if employees believe that IAF provides advice consulting on risk management activities, and 0 otherwise. IAF focus is the sum of Audit plan and Risk areas. Education is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the employee holds a Master or a Doctorate degree, and 0 otherwise. Certification is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if the employee has a professional qualification or certification in internal audit, and 0 otherwise.  Tenure is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if the number of years internal audit has taken place is greater than (or equal to) the median of the years, computed by geographic region, and 0 otherwise. Internal is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if internal audit activities are developed inside the organization, and 0 otherwise. Rotation is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if IAF employees rotate though other parts of the organization, and 0 otherwise. IAF expertise is divided into external and internal expertise. External expertise is the sum of Education and Certification, while internal expertise is the sum of Tenure, Internal, and Rotation. Source is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if the number of sources used to establish an audit plan is greater than 5, and 0 otherwise. Modify is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if respondents never experienced a pressure to suppress or significantly modify a valid internal audit finding or report, and 0 otherwise. IAF autonomy is the sum of Source and Modify. Mandatory is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if an internal audit department is mandated by law in an organization, and 0 otherwise. Audit committee is a composite measure for audit committee existence and characteristics. Number of employees is the number of IAF employees. Total assets (ln) is the natural logarithm of total assets. Sales (ln) is the natural logarithm of sales.   
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Table 6 - The association between IAF characteristics and co-sourcing fees to support internal audit activities in different contexts of corporate law  
VARIABLES Co-sourcing fees (ln) t Co-sourcing fees (ln) t Co-sourcing fees (ln) t Co-sourcing fees (ln) t 
 Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) Column (4) 
 Mandatory t = 0 Mandatory t = 1 Mandatory t = 0 Mandatory t = 1 
     
Intercept 4.8861*** 8.7547*** 4.8047*** 8.5610*** 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) 
Audit plan t  0.4076* 0.3348    (0.092) (0.106)   
Risk areas t 0.1145 0.3702*    (0.676) (0.081)   
IAF focus t   0.3316* 0.3588**    (0.090) (0.021) 
Education t -0.1206 -0.0058    (0.591) (0.978)   
Certification t 0.1482 -0.1519    (0.588) (0.456)   
Tenure t -0.4616* -0.1391    (0.073) (0.494)   
Internal t 0.0069 -0.3369    (0.974) (0.153)   
Rotation t 0.3684 -0.3500    (0.266) (0.204)   
IAF external expertise t   0.0138 -0.0749    (0.935) (0.599) 
IAF internal expertise t   -0.0709 -0.2619**    (0.623) (0.040) 
Source t 0.6053** 0.1613    (0.023) (0.398)   
Modify t 0.5046 -0.0502    (0.138) (0.872)   
IAF autonomy t   0.4941** 0.1052    (0.017) (0.514) 
Audit committee t 0.2542*** 0.2037** 0.2760*** 0.1971**  (0.009) (0.028) (0.005) (0.032) 
Number of employees t 0.0227 0.0743*** 0.0122 0.0743***  (0.485) (0.000) (0.668) (0.000) 
Total assets (ln) t 0.1180* -0.0010 0.1190* 0.0031  (0.081) (0.984) (0.065) (0.947) 
Sales (ln) t 0.1160* 0.1131** 0.1269** 0.1176** 
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 (0.061) (0.047) (0.045) (0.037) 
Region dummies YES YES YES YES 
Industry dummies YES YES YES YES 
Observations 174 219 174 219 
R2 0.484 0.496 0.458 0.494  The values in brackets report p-value significance levels. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.   Co-sourcing fees (ln) is the natural logarithm of co-sourcing fees paid to support IA. Audit plan is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if the percentage of consulting-related activities in the 2015 audit plan is greater than (or equal to) 50 percent, and 0 otherwise. Risk areas is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if employees believe that IAF provides advice consulting on risk management activities, and 0 otherwise. IAF focus is the sum of Audit plan and Risk areas. Education is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the employee holds a Master or a Doctorate degree, and 0 otherwise. Certification is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if the employee has a professional qualification or certification in internal audit, and 0 otherwise.  Tenure is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if the number of years internal audit has taken place is greater than (or equal to) the median of the years, computed by geographic region, and 0 otherwise. Internal is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if internal audit activities are developed inside the organization, and 0 otherwise. Rotation is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if IAF employees rotate though other parts of the organization, and 0 otherwise. IAF expertise is divided into external and internal expertise. External expertise is the sum of Education and Certification, while internal expertise is the sum of Tenure, Internal, and Rotation. Source is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if the number of sources used to establish an audit plan is greater than 5, and 0 otherwise. Modify is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if respondents never experienced a pressure to suppress or significantly modify a valid internal audit finding or report, and 0 otherwise. IAF autonomy is the sum of Source and Modify. Audit committee is a composite measure for audit committee existence and characteristics. Number of employees is the number of IAF employees. Total assets (ln) is the natural logarithm of total assets. Sales (ln) is the natural logarithm of sales.  
